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FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGY
The Legacy of Henry Eccles
Scott A. Boorman

M

any people have valuable insights regarding strategy. Much less widespread is a capability of generating fresh and important analytical insights
at will or on command as new strategic situations and problems arise.
Here we aim to capture the active ingredients of precisely such a capability
that took shape at the Naval War College shortly after World War II. Emanating
from efforts of the Spruance-era College to integrate analytically, and to codify
for the benefit of the United States in future conflicts, lessons learned from U.S.
military successes in the Pacific in a time of maximum naval effort, this body
of analytical thought and writing is exceedingly valuable. While much has
changed, many of the most basic realities of how logistics permeates strategy remain as true now as then. Because this military and intellectual legacy is now at
risk of being imperfectly remembered, when it is remembered at all, this article
also aims to bring to current attention some important early post–World War II
Naval War College writing on strategy.
The leader in these steps to codify relevant military lessons was then-Captain
1
Henry E. Eccles, USN (he retired in 1952 as a rear admiral). Starting during the
Scott A. Boorman is professor of sociology, Department
Naval War College presidency of Admiral Raymond
of Sociology, Yale University. He received his PhD from
A. Spruance—victor of many Pacific War operations,
Harvard and JD from the Yale Law School. Besides milculminating in the Okinawa campaign—Eccles
itary and logistics analysis in the tradition of Admiral
Eccles, his research interests include mathematical
served as founding head (1947–51) of the Departmodels of social structure and processes, network analyment of Logistics (later renamed Department of
sis, effects of information technology, complex statutes,
and complex organizations.
Strategy and Logistics) at the College.2 In part reflecting strands of Eccles’s World War II experience in the
ã 2009 by Scott A. Boorman
Pacific, where he was eventually charged with planning
Naval War College Review, Spring 2009, Vol. 62, No. 2

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 8
92

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

coordination of all bases of all U.S. armed services for the planned invasion of Japan (projected to involve up to five million American military personnel),
Eccles’s written analytical work on war and logistics has a notably systematic
3
quality and an eye for structural issues. Eccles served at the heart of the Pacific
War U.S. naval effort, one of the major success stories in world military history,
and he knew in an unfiltered way the ingredients that made that success possible; the distinction between the militarily vital, the important, and the merely
desirable; what is military reality versus arrows on a map or word pictures in
smooth language. He had the insight, motivation, and tenacity to put this
knowledge down on paper—in the blunt, unvarnished language of U.S. naval
officers of his era, using few acronyms and without civilian jargon.
This work initially took shape in the form of numerous unpublished documents circulated in the Navy and beyond, augmented by extensive correspondence. Eventually, this military thought began to appear in journal articles and
4
books by Eccles. Supplemented at points by comments noting applications of
Eccles’s insights to twenty-first-century contexts, this article builds on research
with the Eccles Papers held in the Naval Historical Collection at the Naval War
5
College.
Two key observations—one substantive, one methodological—anchor and
orient the present inquiry. The first is that strategy, in both theory and practice,
is permeated and shaped by three sets of forces: logistical, psychological (partic6
ularly centering on the psychological aspects of command), and bureaucratic.
In modern war each of these forces is always present and always important.
Something of the complexity of the exercise of modern high command is suggested by the fact that the three sets of forces, viewed in dynamic systems terms,
exhibit very different operating characteristics yet coexist (often in tightly coupled ways) in the concrete conflict situations that commanders must navigate.
The second observation is more Clausewitzian: while the application of strategic principles to particular situations is infinitely variable and at times subtle,
the fundamentals of strategy are relatively few and simple. This means that it is
feasible to create a concise but carefully structured statement of these fundamentals that can be drawn on as a conceptual aid, or template, to help craft strategic approaches as current strategic conditions mutate and fundamentally new
7
situations arise.
Inevitably such a template of theory can reach only so far, and its central
use is creation of a sound starting point that more detailed analysis should
develop further in any given concrete context. Inevitably too, practical use of
theory can never be fully mechanized, and there is always a key element of interpretation—and therefore of intellectual craftsmanship—in moving from theory to application.
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The analytical discussion below is structured in three parts. The first is a definition (or description) of the concept of strategy. The second places strategy in a
larger context (an analytical activity that may also be conceived as exploring pertinent “boundary conditions” that shape strategy). The third elaborates, subject
to space constraints in this article, upon three specific interlocking themes: logistics, control, and flexibility. This third part is particularly conceived in the
spirit of helping strategists ask good questions and generate creative strategic
ideas. It is not intended to illuminate all dimensions of this many-dimensional
subject.
For analytic focus, our emphasis is primarily (though not exclusively) on
political-military affairs, which are the traditional heart of strategic studies—though in an ever more complex and civilianized world it is increasingly
clear that many twenty-first-century growing points of strategic theory and
practice will bear little surface resemblance to twentieth-century war. Here
again the legacy of the early post–World War II Naval War College shows its
tough intellectual fiber to advantage, since the tripartite emphasis on approaching strategy from the perspectives of logistics, command psychology, and bureaucracy that took shape in that era is well suited to encouraging clear thinking
about the conflict environments of the century we are now in.
WHAT STRATEGY IS
The roots of the present analysis lie in a terse memorandum, one of the best
short writings on strategy ever penned, written in 1955 by Herbert Rosinski, a
8
Nazi-era émigré German historian. Central to this document is its theme of
“strategy as control,” which (as importantly further developed by Eccles with an
9
eye to logistics) may be stated in shorthand form as follows:
Strategy = the comprehensive direction of power to
control situations and areas to attain broad objectives.

Given the game-theoretic focus that nowadays so often structures the discussion
of issues deemed “strategic,” it is important to note that the concept of strategy
10
advanced here is essentially a substantive, not a mathematical, one. This is as
it should be, since actual strategic problems are typically far too complex to be
reliably reduced to any single formalism. It is also important that the definition of strategy just given also combines well with further definitions of tactics
11
and logistics.
Each element of this definition—comprising the seven words or phrases listed
below—deserves careful scrutiny and exegesis. It is useful to be alert to ways in
which a particular word or phrase can be misused or misunderstood—thus illuminating roots of strategic error (a rich area for strategic analysis whose crucial
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importance Clausewitz intuitively grasped and that much game theory tends to
ignore or deemphasize).
Comprehensive orients one toward framing strategic calculation as broadly
as possible, missing no “level.” It is remarkable how often intelligent, educated
people fail to grasp this and by so doing fall short of thinking strategically.
Elaborating on “comprehensive” points to three broad classes of problems fac12
ing a strategist:

• Control of the external field of action, whose central focus is the adversary or
adversaries (but may also be expanded to include allies and neutrals).

• Control of the internal field of action, whose focus is the roots of power on
which the strategist draws (e.g., political, public opinion, producer logistics, industrial base, and other “upstream” sources of power, at times extending to the family and social network of a leader or commander).

• Control of the means of control. In the modern era, such means widely pivot
on the general staffs used to surmount cognitive and physical limitations
on any commander, but also come to involve other bureaucracies, complex
organizations, and social networks, many outside the traditional “defense
13
establishment.” Control of the means of control is far more complex than
it first appears, too commonly draining the creativity crucially needed for
the other two problems. Twentieth-century experience suggests two basic
insights: first, that there is a powerful dynamic by which machinery to exert
such control tends to become ever more elaborate, so that its use requires
14
more learning time and attention from commanders; second, that such
machinery is a breeding ground for organizational failures, perhaps multi15
ple, at times of low visibility.
Direction involves the standard sorts of “s/he thinks I think s/he thinks” calculations widely associated with “thinking strategically” in a world attuned to
modern game theory. It also involves many other things, including (for example)
less glamorous but exceedingly crucial logistics calculations as well as active use
of diplomatic skill sets to navigate the outer boundaries of the authority a
commander wields.
Power needs to be given very broad scope, subsuming many different species
of power, military and civilian alike. The complexity of twenty-first-century societies invites imaginative identification of new species of power. Because of the
universal dependence on some form of logistics support, the exercise of power
in practice is often much more complex and more decentralized than is power in
theory—which means that it is often productive to analyze particular types of
16
power through the prism of their logistics requirements.
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In strategic environments where certain types of power are “off the table” at a
given time (i.e., are not effectively usable to achieve given political ends), a basic
challenge for strategists is developing intuition for when a particular type of
power has moved, or is about to move, from an “effectively unusable” to an “ef17
fectively usable” category (or vice versa). Note that the dynamics here, centering around qualitative change in a conflict situation, are frequently more
psychological and at times bureaucratic than technical and accordingly may easily elude analyses based on rational-choice assumptions—with a concomitant
potential for strategic surprise, such as when foes come from very different
cultures.
Control—and focus on its implications and ramifications—is the active ingredient of Rosinski’s seminal 1955 contribution; as control’s antithesis he
points to a “haphazard series of improvisations.” Importantly, control is also a
highly developed engineering concept, a fact that can be used to facilitate conveying strategic ideas to military officers and relevant civilians whose professional roots often lie in engineering and allied areas. One key advantage of
conceptualizing “strategy as control” is the way it invites—as not all concepts of
“strategy” do—exploration of a natural agenda of questions concerning temporal
and other parameters of control (see below). In fact, the control that a strategist is
able to exert often amounts to little more than a “patch” on more basic ongoing
dynamics—for instance, political, economic, demographic, epidemiological.
The phrase situations and areas represents the contexts within which control is
sought. Note that the present definition of strategy steps beyond the geopolitical,
often deeply territorial focus of the world wars and much other warfare, giving
flexibility to subsume, say, bureaucratic warfare, “inner court” factional politics,
and other frequently bitter and protracted, yet not territorial, struggles.
Attaining objectives raises the challenge of defining the criteria of judgment
underlying this concept—and in a surprising array of strategic problems such
criteria are notably unclear.
Objectives refers to actual, not declaratory, strategy. In a world where public
relations has become a function of command often no less important than the
classic duties of a general staff, it is all too easy for strategists to let their declaratory strategies edit their real goals. In one limiting case of this kind of error, the
“objective” is replaced by a mere slogan—which may be accepted with little analysis within an inner circle of high command as well as circulated among a wider
public. High-level decision makers in totalitarian (and some authoritarian)
societies may be particularly prone to this sort of pitfall, sometimes opening
exploitable vulnerabilities because their decision support structures explicitly
lack the traditions of “airing” of alternative positions on issues and general intel18
lectual openness historically associated with the Naval War College.
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An interesting and increasingly important variant problem may arise when a
mission statement is frozen into statute, with all the legal ramifications that
brings with it.
The antidote for such pitfalls starts with sound, careful, even plodding analysis of actual strategic objectives—that is, clarification of what the strategist truly
must accomplish. Breadth of objectives, however—which is one of the true hallmarks of strategy, by contrast to tactics (a distinction game theory characteristically elides)—means that such analysis is rarely trivial, precisely because broad
goals are typically intangible, at times highly abstract, and therefore elusive. To
this problem of analysis, which lies at the heart of strategic tasks, we return
shortly.
STRATEGY IN A LARGER CONTEXT
There are three ways in which a larger context imposes structure on strategy and
strategic planning.
Strategic Objectives and Their Analysis
The purest form of strategic labor is the analysis of objectives. Although not sufficient by itself, the first (and often psychologically difficult) step in effective
analysis of this sort in concrete situations is recognizing that here lies a challenging, often deep, problem—one that certainly outstrips the capabilities of any
single formal or other “model.”
Concepts like “victory” and “defeat” (or indeed “war” and “peace”) are commonly of little help in analyzing objectives. The difficulty of this task (compounded if a strategic situation is rapidly changing) may be greatly magnified by
potent psychological and bureaucratic forces contributing to what is sometimes
19
known as “goal displacement.” Additional factors may also frustrate clear analysis of objectives. For example, too clear an analysis may tend to undermine the
roots of a strategist’s authority—or the glue that holds together a coalition.20
The task of analyzing objectives is frequently elided or otherwise underestimated by the intellectual traditions of “rational choice,” which widely posit that
objectives or their functional equivalents and proxies (e.g., payoff values assigned to game outcomes) have already been effectively analyzed and may there21
fore simply be treated as known parameters.
With the crucial proviso that strategy must always remain dominant—logistics exists to serve strategy, never the other way around—logistics analysis must
always accompany the strategic imagination. Such analysis includes continually
probing the boundary between what is logistically feasible and what is not, and
other logistics ramifications of strategic objectives. Logistics analysis may at
times advise changes of goals—because of logistics limitations on one’s own side
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or an adversary’s exploitable logistics weaknesses. It should also be borne in
mind that logistics (from well functioning supply chains to the health of the
population) is the engine of the better peace that is the ultimate aim of most
wars—and that engine requires analysis, not just after the war but during it.
22
Language and semantic analysis have roles to play too. Part of the task in analyzing strategic objectives is to ferret out conceptual failures—because hazily envisioned future events are the focus—lurking beneath the smooth language in
23
which polished statements of high-level strategic objectives are so often framed.
Because quantification in high-level strategic matters commonly has limited
meaning or utility, as a practical matter the analysis of objectives commonly involves devising a hierarchy of qualitative goals, conjoined with a timetable for
their accomplishment. It is worth bearing in mind that there are many instances,
worldwide, where high-level strategies—and decisions highly relevant to U.S.
national interests—emanate from people who are not professional soldiers, who
may literally never have heard of a U.S. military operation order, and whose ap24
proaches to objectives differ fundamentally from those of the U.S. military.
Relationship between Strategy and the Type of War Being Fought
25
This is the second genuinely deep problem facing the strategist: correctly analyzing the social, political, and other dynamics that form the larger context of
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURES: SELECTED RESEARCH FOCI

Notes:
a. Formal organizational tables of organization, plus command, control, and communications.
b. Multiple types of interlocking networks.
c. Shorthand for complex doctrine in a legal-administrative sense.
d. Information technology (IT)—including algorithms, software, computer networks, and implementation.
These structures, each a component of the twenty-first-century landscape presenting formidable control challenges, are marked by massive and growing complexity; are distinct but ever more interlocked; are new in significant aspects (symbolized by the bidirectional arrows); often have major but inconspicuous impacts; and require analysis, singly and in combination.
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war and peace, with an eye to identifying opportunities to piggyback strategic
control on more basic structural patterns and trends. More than an intelligence
problem, this is a task for broad and creative social observation and analysis,
26
commonly requiring a mix of qualitative and quantitative strands.
In a related spirit, the figure aims to help break strategists’ attentions out of
the grip of standard emphases in the lion’s share of twentieth-century writings
on war and strategy, focusing instead on analyzing four fundamental structures
that will, singly and jointly, do much to shape twenty-first-century conflict environments. Deleting any vertex in this figure, or collapsing any two vertices, risks
significant analytical distortion, because the operating characteristics of each
type of structure are different from those of the other ones.
In a world where markets with prices rule, an important Eccles caution merits
restating: the ability to carry out the relevant analysis effectively is “a rare intel27
lectual quality that cannot be made to order or purchased on the open market.”
Failure in this task of analysis portends perhaps the greatest controllable pitfall
facing any strategist—that of attempting to operate strategically in an imaginary
world!
A crucial strand of the analytic problem here lies in recognizing what Martin
Shubik has termed the “games within the game.” These are subsidiary games involving often extraneous political purposes whose existence greatly complicates
the main “game” in which the strategist is centrally involved, giving lasting,
nontrivial meaning to Clausewitz’s fundamental insistence on the primacy of
28
war’s political purpose.
Roots of Strategy in National or Other Human Values
The third deep way in which larger context impinges on the strategist is the need
to craft strategy to be in harmony with the fundamental values of the larger collectivity (nation, party, faction, or other) that the strategist serves. Such values
may include that collectivity’s concepts of victory and defeat, its affinity with
certain weapons or tools of conflict, and its affinity with certain overall styles of
conflict (e.g., short war versus protracted war, positional versus mobile versus
guerrilla warfare). Harmony with such fundamental, often tacit, values can be a
vast source of strategic strength. In some ways, such harmony is akin to an intangible logistics reserve—a reserve of strategic poise and stamina. In the World
War II era, U.S. strategy achieved and sustained notable harmony with fundamental values and aspirations of the American people. In Vietnam, there was
enormous—and ultimately insuperable—friction between the personal values
and goals of a large segment of the American population and war aims in a pro29
tracted land war in Asia.
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Of course, value harmonization issues face adversaries no less than one’s own
side. This fact creates an enduring niche for analysis geared to recognizing often
subtle strategic opportunities arising when an adversary’s course of action starts
to veer away from his fundamental values, with concomitant potential for exploitable adversary mistakes. Recognizing this kind of opportunity requires special alertness to pitfalls of “mirror imaging” often born of bureaucracy.
IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY
What follows is an Eccles-inspired line of inquiry for orienting and structuring a particular strategic analysis project. The central themes of this line of
inquiry—logistics, control, flexibility—may also be interpreted as “probes” into
principles of strategy.30 Inevitably, given present space constraints, each basic
point below can be raised only briefly and may require imaginative analogical
thinking—or a translator’s instincts—if full benefit is to be derived in application to twenty-first-century conflict situations very different from World War II.
Advanced-base development work, where a major part of Eccles’s World War
II experience lay, was a distinctive and in many ways nontraditional brand of logistics—one marked by an integrative viewpoint spanning many functional logistics specialties while looking simultaneously forward to combat areas and
31
back across the Pacific to the continental United States. This viewpoint, in
which long-haul transportation issues held center stage and underlined key differences between short- and long-range amphibious operations, did much to
shape Eccles’s larger view of the logistics process in relation to strategy. As was
thoroughly appreciated by Eccles and other analysts at the early post–World
War II Naval War College, logistics in modern warfare is inherently a sophisticated concept with important pure and applied, as well as command and tech32
nical, levels.
Many of the logistics insights of the World War II era that Eccles codified have
been thoroughly assimilated and institutionalized by the U.S. military. Yet areas
of structural tension and debate persist, and some trade-offs defy permanent
33
resolution. To shed light on such issues, logistics lessons learned from U.S.
World War II success must be constantly restudied, restated, and retaught—in
ways, one hopes, that attract genuine interest, animated by a sense of curiosity,
from broad audiences of U.S. military officers plus relevant civilians. Application of the same basic lessons remains significantly less well incorporated in U.S.
logistics capabilities for supporting strategic action of nonmilitary types
(among them, capabilities for “nation building”). Meanwhile, a third application
of those lessons pertains to Liddell Hart’s “the other side of the hill”—i.e., the
situation of the adversary. U.S. adversaries have often not learned how to do
some basic part of their logistics quite right, so that a further strand of the living

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 8
100

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

legacy of Admiral Eccles is to suggest ways of identifying and exploiting resulting
vulnerabilities.
For working purposes here, logistics—following Eccles—may be defined as
the creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically
employed to attain strategic objectives. Yet more simply: “Logistics is the means of
34
war.”
In the background of this description lies the concept that logistics is a dynamic system, one whose operating characteristics are a rich source of principles
closely related to, yet not the same as, directly strategic principles, specifically including those familiar from the rubric of the “principles of war.”35 In modern
warfare, this dynamic system is heavily implemented through an enormously
complex defense bureaucracy, yet it has an identity that is not simply reducible
to such bureaucracy. While logistics is closely related to economics, the logistics
process also importantly operates in many nonmarket contexts—including, of
course, combat environments. For related reasons, logistics analysis is not reducible to, even though it obviously overlaps with, standard economic analysis.
Logistics processes have important psychological dimensions (e.g., Eccles emphasized the role of social trust in the provision of logistics support in combat or
36
other wartime conditions). Such psychological aspects of logistics often
coexist awkwardly with standard rational-choice models of the sort that most
economists favor.
Logistics permeates military effort, and in many military contexts the true
contest, extending to both war and peace, is as much between two logistics systems as between two sets of tactical organizations (indeed, it is possible to parse
the Cold War from this viewpoint). To appreciate the true force of this point, it is
important to recognize that logistics factors and principles continue to operate—often with enormously potent effects—whatever those factors and principles may be called. Military terminology is often driven by bureaucratic “chop
lines” and other organizational compromises, so that much logistics structure
and process in modern warfare appear in other guises. Components of a military
establishment that are actually designated as “logistics” organizations are there37
fore frequently pale reflections of the true magnitude of the logistics process.
Building on this background, what follows may be treated as a candidate for
38
the “first principle of strategic logistics.”
In modern war, logistics is the soft underbelly of combat power, vastly more
vulnerable to effective attack—at times direct and obvious, at times indirect and
low-visibility—than is the combat power itself. Underscoring this proposition is
the enormous sweep of logistics activities, ranging over supply, transportation,
base development, weapons systems support, maintenance and repair, personnel, and medical and public health functions. Exploiting the consequences of
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the adversary’s logistics dependence, while defending against logistics depredations by an alert, aggressive foe, is therefore a pivotal ingredient of modern strategy as well as a fine illustration of the strategic necessity of a comprehensive
perspective that ranges far beyond standard combat operations.
Post–World War II analyses suggest that the Japanese missed many opportunities to attack the complicated and often fragile logistics on which U.S. offen39
sives in the Pacific depended. From that day to this it is not obvious that the
United States has ever faced a major adversary who has pushed as hard and as
imaginatively as possible to attack the logistics system on which U.S. military
strength depends. There exist strands of relevant U.S. military experience (e.g.,
Iraqi Scud missile attack on the port city of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, during Op40
eration DESERT STORM); nonetheless, the nation may remain in some ways an
41
inexperienced superpower in “logistics war.”
By extension (although the terminology used is often different), logistics is
also a major source of vulnerability in nonmilitary types of conflict, with the
high connectivity and fragility of civilian society affording a combinatorial explosion of logistics targets. U.S. vulnerabilities to sabotage—including its more
subtle forms, such as “slow-down or misdirection of effort in certain key industries”—particularly caught Eccles’s attention during his years as head of the Na42
val War College Logistics Department.
But the dependence of strategy on logistics has further—and in some ways
yet more far-reaching and challenging—ramifications. Perhaps surprisingly for
some audiences, the heart of Eccles’s logistics thought, as documented by careful
reading of the Eccles Papers, actually points is a somewhat different direction
from that just explored.
Specifically, in much of modern warfare the most important (and difficult)
“game” confronting a commander may be that associated with the struggle to assert command and control over his own logistics (a struggle on which any ad43
verse effects of hostile action are an overlay). Central here is the principle of the
“logistics snowball,” which in Eccles’s classic formulation describes the tendency
of the logistics support of combat power to grow to a size out of all proportion to
that of the combat forces supported—until, like a snowball being pushed up a
hill, logistics becomes so massive and sluggish that further progress is barely
44
possible.
This is a fundamental insight into how logistics systems behave as dynamic
45
systems, as true in the twenty-first century as in the World War II era. Major
contemporary versions and generalizations of the “snowball” effect and its ramifications may be found in many of the structures on which twenty-first-century
societies rest (see again the figure on page 97): bureaucracy and complex organizations; social networks (comprising multiple types of network ties);
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algorithms, software, and computer networks; and complex statutes and administrative regulations—among them, procurement regulations.
To the extent that taming the snowball is not an impossible game, the feasibility of doing so crucially depends on application for strategic purposes of a further set of fundamental principles centering on command and control of the
46
logistics process. Here it is important that under peacetime conditions logis47
tics responsibilities tend to become diffuse. This means that when war or other
crises come, the “game” of taming relevant snowball(s) may easily have no outcome consistent with achieving a larger strategic purpose within the finite time
48
window allowed by such external forces as public opinion.
Under twenty-first-century conditions this may be an exceptionally important
principle, applicable to future uses of power by the United States. To anchor this
problem in recent U.S. military experience in Iraq, consider a question posed by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in his 29 September 2008 speech to a National
Defense University audience: “Why did we have to go outside the normal bureaucratic process to develop counter-IED [improvised explosive device] technologies, to build MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicles], and to quickly
49
expand our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability?”
The difficulty (and urgency) of controlling the logistics snowball naturally
begets a further principle: especially given the ultrahigh dimensionality of modern logistics, dependence of strategy on logistics also gives ample room for updated and expanded versions of the old saying “He who controls the spare parts
controls the operation.”
With the caveat that strategy must always remain dominant, enough has been
said to suggest a further principle: At sufficiently high levels of command—and
perhaps separately, at sufficiently deep levels of analysis—strategy and logistics
50
tend to coalesce.
Strategy-as-control is not about making no mistakes. The cold, pale light of
logistics reality alone makes this virtually impossible. Success tends to go to the
side that makes the fewest mistakes, or at any rate the fewest major ones. “Control” is, in short, often a highly imperfect construct—a point that many devotees
of mathematics in strategic analysis tend to miss.
One reason the strategy-as-control theme is so productive as a launching
point for the development of strategic principles is that it invites a range of
searching analytic questions in any given strategic context (consider, e.g., a context involving potential use of biological weapons or of weapons whose use has
long-term environmental implications).
One useful specific list of such questions appears in Eccles’s writings on strategy.51 This list follows (and note that the more seriously any of the questions on
it is pursued, the more logistics issues tend to arise):
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What to control [i.e., the object or objects of control; and note here that
strategy-as-control is commonly cumulative],
What is the purpose of this control,
What is the nature of the control,
What degree of control is necessary,
When the control is to be initiated,
How long the control is to be maintained,
What general method or scheme of control is to be used.

Perhaps most fundamentally, strategy-as-control clarifies the essential unity
of its subject matter across diverse spheres of human action. At the same time,
the concept also encourages analysis of interesting special cases—for example,
52
control directed at the self.
Grand strategy may be interpreted as a special case where either: (1) control is
sought with a distinctively deep time horizon (e.g., as in “grand strategy of the
53
Chinese empire”); or (2) the search for such control has a distinctively combinatorial aspect, bringing into play a mix of tools of many kinds—among them,
54
diplomatic, psychological, and economic, as well as purely military. The sheer
multiplicity of types of networks simultaneously in play in many twentyfirst-century conflicts is compelling more conflict actors than ever before—many of them nongovernmental—to attempt to think and operate as
grand strategists in sense (2). As the long twentieth-century century road to
55
building U.S. joint operations capability suggests by partial analogy, actually
56
achieving the integration of tools grand strategy requires is far from easy. Indeed,
such integration is in many ways harder than that involved in military joint operations, since nonmilitary tools are so diverse—often relative to each other no less
than to military ones—and are intertwined with comparably diverse organiza57
tions, logistics, and even basic assumptions about human nature and society.
Even beneath a level of grand strategy, the strategy-as-control theme valuably
deflects focus from any one tool or weapon of conflict (which, pushed to a logical limit, produces the pathology Eccles dubbed “weapon strategy”), instead expanding attention given to integrated employment of all available tools in
generating the desired extent and nature of control. Because so many military
officers and relevant civilian professionals have career backgrounds heavily invested in specific weapons systems, a strategy-as-control viewpoint can do valu58
able service in helping avert incipient “weapon strategy” traps. Here again it is
relevant to note that strategy-as-control connects on a basic level with themes of
control central to modern engineering theory and practice (note, for example,
the crucial importance of time and timing factors in strategy). A particularly
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important strand of the strategy-as-control theme—one that will be of
fundamental importance in many twenty-first-century contexts—is its profound connection with a world of ever deeper dependence on software and the
59
mathematical-logical algorithms that software embodies.
One major contrast case for strategy-as-control is “strategy as destruction,” a
60
false equation that received much currency early in the nuclear age. This false
equation finds more recent reflection in widespread tacit assumptions that biological or chemical attacks are necessarily geared to creating maximum feasible
destructive impact on a human group, as contrasted with more nuanced manipulations of political and social processes in target societies.61
Strategy-as-control is also a fine starting point for capturing, comparing, and
transposing the active ingredients of some of the most distinguished contributions to strategic thought spanning many cultures and historical eras. Among
these are (moving roughly from east to west): Chinese (here note not only Sun
Tzu and the Chinese military tradition but also lessons born of two millenniums
of imperial Chinese bureaucracy), Mongol, Indian subcontinent, Iranian (e.g.,
note mirrors-of-princes advice literature), Arab, Ottoman, and Byzantine. In
some cases non-Western strategic and other intellectual traditions may contain
important insights about control possibilities that are little known or developed
62
in Western contexts.
A focus on strategy-as-control leads naturally to a focus on strategic flexibility and its roots. In some contexts, strategy certainly demands decisive action or
some extremely carefully reasoned form of irreversible commitment of the sort
63
analyzed in the strategic writings of Thomas Schelling. Yet the fog of war,
fluidity of long-term situations, and ultimately the opacity of complex social
structure and process itself (perhaps the richest of all sources of uncertainty
facing a strategist) guarantee that strategic flexibility needs to be available when
desired—as it often will be.
In thinking about the roots of flexibility, or deficit thereof, it is helpful to distinguish two quite different classes of contributing factors, each having many
strands. In this regard, note also a basic asymmetry: producing strategic flexibility typically requires many ingredients, but inducing strategic inflexibility may
need only one.
The first set of factors centers around the mind of command and is essentially
psychological (or sociological, if one allows for the role of staff and others in the
commander’s environment, often amounting to a well defined social structure).
Psychological flexibility may be easy to attain in theory, but (as Clausewitz saw
clearly long ago) it is vastly harder amid the stunning emotional and physical
pressures of bitter conflict with deadly force. In particular, circumstances may
require juggling denial of the possibility of failure of strategic ends—even where
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all evidence is to the contrary—while at the same time exhibiting the highest
level of virtuosity in shifting with poise and flexibility among choices of means.
Such pressures may be short-term (say, hours or days), or they may be long-term
(such as protracted revolutionary war), with quite different psychological contexts and consequences.
In addition, more subtle forms of flexibility loss, amounting to creeping institutional inertia, may accumulate as a largely unplanned by-product of the operation of institutions of command over a long period of time—via persistence of
flawed decisions that many recognize as flawed yet that no one seems to know
how to correct (even when, at times, those decisions far outlast the organizational tenure of those who made them). As institutions of command, including
bureaucracies, age through the course of the twenty-first century, these subtle
institutional flaws and the loss of strategic flexibility they entail may become
more pronounced.
The second set of factors returns to logistics and centers around the physical
substance of flexibility—the quality of a strategist’s logistics, especially transportation. One of the twentieth century’s most powerful examples of logistics
flexibility as foundation of strategic flexibility is the relationship between the
success in World War II of U.S. naval operations in the Pacific and the wartime
development of mobile logistics support and the strategic mobility it permitted.
It is well worth reflecting on the quality of logistics thought and leadership that
64
made such innovation possible midstream in a great war.
THE DUALITY OF STRATEGIC AND LOGISTICS ANALYSIS
Crafting high-level strategy is, and will remain, extraordinarily difficult. This is
because logistics, psychology, and bureaucracy are difficult, often counterintuitive
subjects—and few experiences (certainly in ordinary civilian life) adequately
prepare anyone to cope at a high level with their interacting complexities. Even
individuals who have been outstanding strategists in one strategic context may
easily reemerge as blunderers in a different one.65
Responding to these challenges, the analytic capability that took shape at the
Naval War College in the early post–World War II period was an unusual synthesis—in some ways without precedent—and an enduring U.S. national resource
that merits careful continuing study, with an eye both to its substance and to the
institutional and intellectual conditions that made such synthesis possible. Although there were numerous strands in the synthesis, at its heart lay the duality
of strategic and logistics analysis.66 Without the strategic level—whose principles this article has sought to retrieve and develop in updated form—logistics
tends to unravel into a formless sprawl of technical areas, lacking clear focus and
identity. Without constant reference to the logistics foundation, strategic
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analysis tends to become like much modern art—perhaps intellectually
stimulating but of unclear relation to the world as we know it.
With an eye to future applications of the key ideas, the body of theory and
principle developed in the present article is geared to three distinct, if related,
67
sets of tasks:

• Education for modern high command, centering around inculcating intuitive awareness of the natures and relationships of structural elements of
the full strategic problem the strategist must be prepared to tackle.

• Creation of a basic and lasting intellectual organization for the study of strategy, one that can serve as a “template” for the ongoing development of strategic topics and disciplined accumulation of strategic ideas—thus creating
a reserve of strategic and related logistics thinking that can be readily retrieved and consulted under often far-from-ideal crisis conditions, as well
as helping with strategic planning more broadly.

• Creation of a conceptual environment conducive to disciplined forms of strategic creativity, an environment whose hallmark is fundamentally original,
68
valid, and valuable insights.
While each generation must revisit these tasks with fresh eyes, there are few
better starting points for their successful accomplishment than active institutional memory of the pioneering analytic contributions of the U.S. Naval War
College in the age of Admirals Raymond A. Spruance and Henry E. Eccles.

NOTES
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1. For further background on Eccles’s career
contributions as a U.S. Navy line officer (Naval Academy ’22)—emphasizing Eccles’s
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Navy Cross–winning command in combat in
the vicinity of Java early in World War
II—see the tribute to Eccles by Rear Adm. R.
F. Marryott, USN, “President’s Notes,” Naval
War College Review 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1986),
pp. 4–5. In June 1985 the library of the U.S.
Naval War College was named in Admiral
Eccles’s honor. See Admiral Eccles’s “Remarks at Dedication of Eccles Library at Naval War College,” Naval War College Review
38, no. 6 (November–December 1985), pp.
96–97.
2. The story of the founding of the Naval War
College Department of Logistics is told in
John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III,
and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars:
The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War
College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
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Press, 1984), p. 186. On Spruance see Cdr.
Thomas B. Buell, USN, The Quiet Warrior: A
Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
3. Within worldwide traditions of military and
related strategic theory—holding aside the
game-theoretic tradition—the major theorists besides Eccles whose analytical work exhibits comparably systematic and codifying
instincts are Napoleon’s two leading interpreters, Clausewitz and Jomini. In effect,
Eccles’s writings are placeholders for
“thoughts on war” of a major part of the
World War II generation of senior U.S. Navy
leaders. Of course, full consensus across a
population of strong-minded professionals
can never be expected—a point on which
Eccles, for one, was thoroughly realistic. (To
illustrate, a specific conceptual disagreement
in Naval War College circles on the relation
of logistics to strategy is noted by Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy,” Naval War College Review 10, no. 5 [January 1958], p. 25.)
4. Eccles’s books were Operational Naval Logistics, NAVPERS 10869 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Naval Personnel, April 1950); Logistics in the National Defense, 1st ed. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959); Military Concepts
and Philosophy (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1965); and Military
Power in a Free Society (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 1979). Both the 1959 and
the 1965 books were written with support
from the Office of Naval Research (ONR)
through the George Washington University
Logistics Research Project. A further sampler
of Eccles’s published writings, augmented by
the limited but important set of his unpublished writings represented in the Naval War
College Library catalog, appears in Naval War
College Review 30, no. 1 (Summer 1977), pp.
26–27. This list is usefully supplemented by a
list of Eccles’s publications in the Naval War
College Review, contained in the Review index
(available online or on compact disc); most,
but not all, signed Eccles publications in the
Review appear on this list. In its “Author”
section this index—providing a profile of a
major U.S. military periodical published continuously since its founding in 1948—contains more single-authored entries under
Eccles’s name than under that of any other
individual author.
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5. The Eccles Papers Project, which was initiated in 1986 at Admiral Eccles’s request and
invitation to the present author and Dr. Paul
R. Levitt (a mathematician who died in
1999), is announced and briefly described in
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
Shipmate 49, no. 9 (November 1986), p. 13.
Hereafter the notation “EP X.Y” refers to box
X, folder Y in the Eccles Papers in the Naval
War College Naval Historical Collection.
6. Two key Eccles observations help give unity
to these three topics of logistics, command
psychology, and bureaucracy. The first is that
the modern logistics organization is the home
of complex organization; see, for example,
comment in Operational Naval Logistics, p.
29, to the effect that logistics organizations
tend to be much more complex than tactical
ones. In many ways Operational Naval Logistics is a book about bureaucracy. The second
observation is that the perspective of command by its nature must reconcile conflicting
imperatives of strategy, logistics, and tactics—a task that involves many psychological
as well as bureaucratic challenges. The interconnectedness of strategy, logistics, and tactics is symbolized by the interlocking-rings
diagram in Eccles, “Theatre Logistic Planning,” U.S. Naval War College Information
Service for Officers 3, no. 2 (October 1950), p.
3. (This was the predecessor publication to
the Naval War College Review.)
7. Related “template making” instincts are already plainly apparent in Eccles’s “Basic Elements and Aspects of Logistics,” 27 August
1947, typescript of his lecture launching the
first year of the Naval War College Logistics
Course (EP 30.21). In much more highly developed form, Eccles’s structural approach to
modern warfare is presented in his Command
Logistics, submitted with foreword dated 8
February 1956 by Capt. K. E. Jung, USN,
Head, Strategy and Logistics Dept., and approved by Rear Adm. Thomas H. Robbins,
Jr., USN, Chief of Staff (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1956) (EP 44.3, copy identified
as “Issue to Naval Warfare Class, 1956”; also
held in the Eccles Library of the Naval War
College).
8. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 313 note 4, identifying this memo, “New
Thoughts on Strategy,” as “written by Dr.
Herbert Rosinski in September, 1955,
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following informal discussions with the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral
Lynde McCormick, and his chief of staff,
Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr.” Text
of Rosinski’s memo appears in this 1965 book
of Eccles, pp. 46–47, and is also reproduced
in Eccles’s Military Power in a Free Society,
pp. 60–61. For further background on
Rosinski’s thought see The Development of
Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, ed.
and with an introduction by B. Mitchell
Simpson III (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977).
9. The basic early reference is Eccles, “Notes on
Strategy as Control: Its Influence on Logistics
and Organization” (first draft of working paper prepared under sponsorship of the
George Washington University Logistics Research Project, under contract N7 ONR
41904, n.d. [1957]) (EP 82.23).
10. Without minimizing the many contributions
of game theory to fundamental strategic analysis, it is important to keep in clear analytic
focus substantive issues of logistics, command psychology, and bureaucracy that game
theory applications often elide or miss. This
task is increasingly important given the numerous civilians in high policy-related roles
who are economics trained—training that
nowadays widely encourages them to equate
“strategic analysis” with game theory.
11. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 69 (presenting coordinated definitions of
strategy, logistics, and tactics as a unified
package). As Eccles here defines it, tactics is
“the immediate employment of specific
forces and weapons to attain strategic objectives”; Eccles’s corresponding definition of
logistics is reproduced on p. 100 of this
article.
12. This three-way distinction builds on Eccles,
Military Power in a Free Society, p. 70.
13. For a valuable study of basic principles pertaining to general staffs, one that deserves to
be much better known today, see Maj. Gen.
Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the
General Staff (Washington, D.C.: Infantry
Journal Press, 1946). Eccles’s review in U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 73, no. 6 (June
1947), pp. 720–21, provides a useful, terse introduction to Nelson’s massive book. Organizational struggles to surmount “control of the
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means of control” problems exist under
many other rubrics too (e.g., budget control,
surveillance, inspection, internal audit, program evaluation, etc.). As Chinese history can
attest, some of these are old—much older, in
fact, than the modern general staff.
14. The General Staff Act of 1903 created a general staff for the U.S. Army. It has been commented that by midcentury the United States
had acquired, with perhaps characteristically
American enthusiasm, no fewer than ten kindred entities (military plus civilian Navy staff;
ditto, Army; ditto, Air Force; Marine Corps
staff; staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; National Security Council staff; staff of
the Bureau of the Budget, later Office of
Management and Budget). Although there
were also earlier versions of a joint staff, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 crystallized
what was has been called “a real joint staff.”
With the early twenty-first century has come
Homeland Security, plus the new intelligence
bureaucracy.
15. A telling example, from a recent biography of
the World War I British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) commander in chief, Douglas Haig, is
that—in context of a great war on whose
outcome the British Empire’s fate turned
—“Haig could not hope to control every aspect of the working of the BEF; he did not
even have complete control over his closest
staff.” See Gary Mead, The Good Soldier: The
Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic
Books, 2007), p. 239 [emphasis supplied].
16. As Eccles noted in 1960: “In modern conflict
the man who understands and controls the
capabilities and location of electronic command equipment can in effect decide who
will wield actual command authority.” See
Eccles’s review of Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,
U.S. Army Dept., 1953 and 1959), vol. 2, in
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 7, no. 1
(March 1960), p. 97.
17. See Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society, p.
56.
18. The case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq comes to
mind. See, for example, Jill Crystal, “Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab
World,” World Politics 46, no. 2 (January
1994), p. 279.
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19. See Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” Social Forces 18, no. 4
(May 1940), p. 563. Pitfalls of goal displacement arising when a strategic situation is
changing rapidly may be illustrated by the
later stages of some successful coalition wars,
when a coalition partner (e.g., the United
States as World War II was ending) persists
in thinking strategically when it should be
thinking grand strategically—that is, about
how to position for the upcoming postwar
situation. Note also the case of post-9/11 U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan, whose objectives
started with a focus on “Osama Bin Laden
dead or alive” and subsequently evolved into
versions of nation building there. For some of
the complexities of the latter—further illustrating just how difficult the analysis of objectives can be—see Francis Fukuyama,
“Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” in Nation-Building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2006), pp. 1–16.
20. For an illustration of the stresses that thorough analysis of objectives may impose on
even a strong coalition, note the difficulties
arising in the work of the Anglo-American
Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War
II—in particular, the challenges faced by
Adm. E. J. King and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff “to get the British to commit themselves
in writing.” See Thomas B. Buell, Master of
Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p.
338 [emphasis supplied].
21. As a working approximation, the phrase “traditions of rational choice” refers to majority
strands of microeconomics, decision theory,
and game theory. Eccles’s long-standing intellectual attention to alternatives to rational
choice is clear from his analytical work. That
attention is well illustrated by Eccles’s review
in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 10, no. 4
(December 1963), pp. 383–87, of an important work by Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of
Government (New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963). For further work along related lines, see Scott A. Boorman, Alternatives
to Rational Choice: Analytical Outline of Substantive Area—Part I, Preliminary Paper
001013 (New Haven, Conn.: Cowles Foundation, 13 October 2000), and Alternatives to
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Rational Choice: Analytical Outline of
Substantive Area—Parts II & III, Preliminary
Paper 030116 (New Haven, Conn.: Cowles
Foundation, 16 January 2003). Both papers
were produced under the auspices of the
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
22. Eccles’s focus on semantic dimensions of
strategy, and on language issues more
broadly, at times drawing inspiration from
Alfred North Whitehead, makes Eccles unusual—indeed, perhaps unique—among
logistics-minded analysts of strategy.
23. In this connection, the work translators do
merits consideration as an oft-neglected factor in grand strategy. A paper by Eccles analyzes translation problems, among other
challenges, facing staff work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the
crucial formative years of the alliance; see
Eccles, “Allied Staffs,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 79, no. 8 (August 1953), pp.
859–67. Although not usually thought of in
this way, reliance on acronyms presents a
kind of translation problem, one that at times
may also severely hamper clear analysis of
objectives.
24. Illustrating some of the possibilities, for
certain actors emotions may enter in
tie-breaking roles when no uniquely “optimal” course of action presents itself. See, e.g.,
Jon Elster, “Emotions and Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 1
(1998), pp. 59–60.
25. It is hard to overstate the extent to which
many strategic debates boil down to disagreements over one or another version of the underlying “what kind of war” question (which,
of course, was classically posed by Clausewitz:
see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
[Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1984], pp. 88–89). An example of a strategic
argument pivoting on a “what kind of war”
issue is Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad,
Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2
(March/April 2006), pp. 2–14.
26. For precisely this reason, the center of gravity
of much insightful strategic analysis lies in
empirical work “upstream” of the kinds of
game-theoretically motivated calculations
widely associated with “thinking like a
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strategist.” For example, shrewd social observation underlies Eccles’s sharp-edged
role-playing exercise in strategy in Eccles,
“Allied Staffs,” p. 867—beginning, “As a Russian, I would attempt . . .” In this kind of analytic work there remains room for more
sophisticated blending of mathematical and
empirical analytic capabilities (possibly
drawing on some types of social network
analysis).
27. See Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy,
p. 201. For a larger context see Lyman B.
Kirkpatrick, Jr., “Eccles on Strategy,” Naval
War College Review 30, no. 1 (Summer 1977),
pp. 10–17.
28. See Martin Shubik, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 643–53. A further relevant direction of analytic work stems
from “garbage can” interpretations of organizational choice. See, e.g., James G. March and
Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds., Ambiguity
and Command: Organizational Perspectives on
Military Decision Making (Marshfield, Mass.:
Pitman, 1986).
29. On the Vietnam War case see Eccles, “The
Vietnam Hurricane,” Shipmate 36, no. 7
(July–August 1973), pp. 23–26.
30. The potential value of multiple “probes” into
the principles of strategy finds support in
Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, USN, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), a
work also influenced by Rosinski. An enlarged set of “probes” (seven, not three)—
combining strands of Eccles’s and Wylie’s
work, along with that of other modern strategic theorists like Capt. Sir Basil H. Liddell
Hart (1895–1970)—is contained in a longer,
unpublished version of the present article.
31. See Eccles’s major 1945 report—rich in concrete examples—to Commander, Service
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “The Establishment
of Advanced Naval Bases in the Central Pacific Area, as Seen by the Advanced Base Section, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet,” 10
December 1945 (EP 85.2–4; EP 85.3 copy is
further identified as “Collateral Reading for
Correspondence Course in Logistics,” Department of Correspondence Courses, U.S.
Naval War College).
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32. Already apparent in Eccles’s 1947 lecture,
“Basic Elements and Aspects of Logistics,” the
distinctively multilevel nature of logistics as a
military concept is further developed in his
“Logistics: What Is It?” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 79, no. 6 (June 1953), pp. 645–53
(perhaps Eccles’s best-known published paper). For a full-scale, book-length development, see Eccles’s Logistics in the National
Defense. A Russian perspective on Eccles’s
work may be found in a 1963 “pirated” Russian translation of this book containing a detailed analytical preface by a Soviet Navy rear
admiral, V. I. Andreyev (a preface in turn
translated into English by the Office of Naval
Intelligence [EP 11.24]). See EP 64.5 for
translated copy.
33. Illustrating continuing analytic challenges,
see David Moore and Peter D. Antill, “Focused Logistics: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?” RUSI Journal 144, no. 5 (October 1999),
pp. 28–33, itemizing eight potential advantages and ten potential disadvantages of this
concept (also alluding, in a context of disadvantages, to Wylie’s theme that “the ultimate
tool of control in war is the man on the scene
with a gun” [Military Strategy, p. 87]).
34. The more compact of the two definitions
here is derived from Pure Logistics, a pioneering work of Lt. Col. Cyrus Thorpe, USMC,
first published in 1917 and later “rediscovered” and brought to the attention of U.S.
military circles by Eccles. The slightly lengthier definition crystallized somewhat later but
is thereafter used with high consistency in
Eccles’s work—paralleling in this regard his
similarly consistent usage of the term
“strategy.”
35. Historical analysis of “dynamics of logistics”
is the focus of two unpublished manuscripts
by Eccles providing some seventy-five pages
of commentary on volumes 1 and 2, respectively, of Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the
Armies (see EP 45.4 and 46.4). A highly condensed version of his commentary on volume
1 appeared in book-review form in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 7 (July 1954),
pp. 813–14. That on volume 2 appeared in
two distinct condensed forms: one book review cited in note 16 above, another in U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 86, no. 5 (May
1960), pp. 108–11. Dynamic systems aspects
of logistics are further documented in James
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A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,
1775–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966).
This work specifically credits Eccles’s pioneering analysis of the logistics snowball
principle (see p. 659).
36. For military analysis quoting work of Nobel
economist Kenneth J. Arrow on trust in a social sense, see Donald Chisholm, “Negotiated
Joint Command Relationships: Korean War
Amphibious Operations, 1950,” Naval War
College Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), pp.
65–124. Related emphases permeated Eccles’s
thinking in the 1940s and ’50s about many
logistics problems. See, e.g., Eccles’s discussion of “unnecessary followup” (in context of
the requisition system in naval supply depots) in Logistics in the National Defense, pp.
187–89. In one of his reviews of Ruppenthal’s
volume 2, cited in note 35, Eccles writes of
the need for “mutual confidence between superior and subordinate,” in whose absence
the logistics “pendulum can make wide
swings between acute shortage, true privation, and reckless overestimates and wastage”
(p. 109). Beyond the social trust theme alone,
Eccles’s analytical work starting in the 1940s
allocates substantial attention to “logistic psychology.” This topic is approached not
merely as a technical area but also as a province of command—epitomized by the struggle to integrate conflicting demands of
strategy, logistics, and tactics in the mind of
command.
37. Expanding on a related analytical point,
Eccles (Military Power in a Free Society, p. 63)
says: “The word ‘logistics’ can disappear from
all organizational titles and directives, from
all curricula, and, in fact, from the military
vocabulary itself without in any way influencing the nature of war, the nature of the problem of war, or the problems of command and
command decision. The forces of ‘military
economics’ will continue to work regardless
of the words and titles used to describe
them.”
38. Although space does not permit elaboration
here, this principle harmonizes with the classic concept of the “indirect approach” to
strategy formulated by Capt. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart (who corresponded with Eccles
from the early 1950s until shortly before Liddell Hart’s death in 1970).
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39. See Eccles, “Pacific Logistics” (presentation,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 30 March
1946 [delivered while Eccles was serving in
Washington as a member of the Joint Operations Review Board]) (EP 30.18). Text of this
presentation, along with other analytic writings by Eccles, is cited by Samuel E. Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), p. 100.
40. On 16 February 1991 there was a Scud missile
impact in the immediate vicinity of an
ammunition-laden pier at Al Jubayl. Importantly, a postwar evaluation observes that
“initially, this event received a considerable
amount of attention. However, the initial
surge of interest diminished over time because
no personnel injuries and no equipment
damage occurred as a result of the missile’s
impact” [emphasis supplied]. See “Case Narrative: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia,” Final Report,
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf
War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, U.S. Defense Dept., 25
October 2001, available at www.gulflink.osd
.mil/al_jub_iii/. Compare historian Alfred W.
Crosby’s “An Inquiry into the Peculiarities of
Human Memory,” chap. 15 in America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989),
pp. 311–28. Crosby forcefully stresses the
puzzling fact that this pandemic was so
quickly largely forgotten and had little impact
on most organizations and institutions (p.
323). If such collective forgetting could occur
in the case of a pandemic that (by Crosby’s
estimate) in ten months killed more Americans than the “combined battle deaths of personnel of the United States Armed Forces in
World War I, World War II, and the Korean
and Vietnamese conflicts” (and may have
sickened 40 percent of U.S. Navy personnel
in 1918), it is reasonable to wonder about the
durability in collective memory of lessons in
logistics war.
41. Perhaps especially with the fading of World
War II memories, it may be easy for American decision makers to become overconfident
about the immunity of the superb U.S. logistics capabilities with which they are so familiar. Consider, e.g., David Greenberg,
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“Just-in-Time Inventory System Proves Vulnerable to Labor Strife,” Los Angeles Business
Journal, 7 October 2002, p. 13.
42. See Eccles, “Logistics in a Future War” (seminar lecture for Naval Reserve Officers, Third
Naval District, U.S. Navy Receiving Station,
Brooklyn, N.Y., 18 January 1949 [from which
the words quoted in the main text are
drawn]) (EP 31.2). See also Eccles’s statement, again with an eye to future war, in Operational Naval Logistics (p. 151): “Sabotage,
in the past never more than a nuisance, may
well be serious.”
43. Amplifying relevant challenges, Eccles wrote:
“Economic capabilities limit the combat
forces which can be created. At the same time,
logistic capabilities limit the forces which can
be employed in combat operations” (Logistics
in the National Defense, p. 41 [emphasis in
original]). These two kinds of limitations are
clearly intertwined, but they are conceptually
distinguishable. Together, they form background to a statement of Robert B. Carney
(then vice admiral, USN, and future Chief of
Naval Operations): “There you have the meat
of the matter: Logistics actually control the
Nation’s foreign policy by reason of the limiting effect of the Nation’s potential in resources.” Address to the Naval War College,
12 July 1947, quoted in Eccles, Operational
Naval Logistics, p. 1.
44. The importance and sheer complexity of
never-ending struggles by commanders to exert control over their own logistics is a major
theme throughout Eccles’s writings. His “logistics snowball” insight emerged as a generalization from logistics experience in World
War II in the Pacific, which Eccles knew in
great depth. Factors underlying the growth of
the snowball are analyzed in his Logistics in
the National Defense, pp. 102–14. A useful
picture of how things have been working
quite recently comes from Col. Bradley E.
Smith, USA, “The Mandate to Revolutionize
Military Logistics,” Air & Space Power Journal
21, no. 2 (Summer 2007), p. 91: “As Federal
Times reported on the initial tip of the iceberg, ‘During the first month of major combat operations in Iraq two years ago, the
Defense Department lost track of $1.2 billion
in materials shipped to the Army, encountered hundreds of backlogged shipments, and
ran up millions of dollars in fees to lease or

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/8

replace storage containers because of backlogged or lost shipments.’” See also p. 93 of
Colonel Smith’s article: “Currently in Iraq,
millions of dollars in penalty costs are
assessed each month for a multitude of reasons, many of which can be traced back to a
fundamental difference of opinion between
strategic-level logisticians and tactical-level
combat commanders concerning the use of
containers. (At the national level, logisticians
were leasing and procuring containers as if
they were transportation commodities to be
quickly returned from Iraq. But tactical-unit
commanders did as they always have in combat and held on to containers to be used for
mobile storage, bunkers, security walls, and
work space.)”
45. Many of the basic problem areas identified by
Colonel Smith’s 2007 article are reminiscent
of problems analyzed forty years earlier by
Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) Graham W. Rider,
USAF, “Logistics: The Bridge,” Air University
Review 19, no. 1 (November–December
1967), pp. 93–97, whose title is from Eccles’s
1959 book. Those problem areas include bureaucracy doing its thing in ways that fail to
harmonize logistics efforts across strategic,
operational, and tactical levels, a somewhat
confused organizational structure, and above
all a vital unmet need to integrate information better, all set against a backdrop of failures to apply what we already know—itself a
key challenge for logistics education.
46. Working in a supply- and repair-centered
context, a pair of RAND Corporation analysts clarify why the quest for improved formulations of basic logistics principles should
never cease: While Marine Corps initiatives
propose “to reduce the ‘iron mountain’ using
information technology, some part of that
mountain will always remain. . . . Indeed, the
smaller the mountain, the more critical it will
be to manage it effectively.” See Ronald D.
Fricker, Jr., and Marc L. Robbins, Retooling
for the Logistics Revolution: Designing Marine
Corps Inventories to Support the Warfighter
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), p. xvii
[emphasis supplied]. For a classic statement
of Eccles’s insights into basic logistics principles, see his Logistics in the National Defense.
Because many of the ideas there reflect
Eccles’s distinctively integrative, multidisciplinary, logistics background from his
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Pacific War experience, Eccles’s ideas merit
careful study in contexts ranging beyond supply—and perhaps even beyond traditionally
recognized logistics functions altogether.
47. Structural forces—many of them essentially
bureaucratic—underlying such tendency to
diffuseness are analyzed in Eccles, “Logistics,”
pp. 650–51.
48. A terse, forceful analysis appears in Eccles,
“Some Logistics Concepts,” Logistics Spectrum 11, no. 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 5–8. This
paper—importantly anchored in the U.S. logistics experience in Vietnam—was reprinted
under the title “How Logistics Systems Behave,” Logistics Spectrum 16, no. 2 (Summer
1982), pp. 31–34. Eccles’s analytical contributions in support of the U.S. naval logistics effort in Vietnam are positively noted by Vice
Adm. Edwin Bickford Hooper, USN (Ret.),
Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War,
1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Naval History
Division, U.S. Navy Dept., 1972), p. viii.
49. Text of this 29 September 2008 speech by the
secretary of defense is available at www
.defenselink.mil/speeches/.
50. Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy” (cited in note
3 above), p. 25; Eccles, Command Logistics, p.
8.
51. See, e.g., Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, p. 48.
52. An example of a challenging problem of
self-control—involving the inner circle of
high command at the height of a major crisis—is the case, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, of the Executive Committee, whose
fifteen members sought to preserve the secrecy of key impending U.S. strategic steps
by, for example, keeping “routine appointments where possible.” See Theodore C.
Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1965), p. 698.
53. For an illustration of strategic thinking aiming to look more than a human generation
ahead—the context being an estimate of how
long communism was likely to survive before,
in Eccles’s words, “failing under its own
faults”—see Eccles, “The World Outlook of
Communism (a Comparison between Communist Philosophy and American Philosophy)” (seminar lecture for Naval Reserve
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Officers, Third Naval District, U.S. Navy Receiving Station, Brooklyn, 19 October 1948)
(EP 29.2). Counting in slightly different
units, it is said of Bismarck that he thought in
terms of the war after next.
54. A related acronym in current circulation is
DIME (“diplomacy, information, military,
and economics”). One pitfall with any such
acronym, of course, is that it may encourage
thinking to stop with the received categories.
Such a stopping rule may work at some lower
levels of action but not in true grand strategy—where opportunities may arise from being early to recognize and exploit some
coherent, perhaps emerging, set of tools that
is not “one to one” with any of the given categories and may in important respects scramble them. (It is also worth noting that an
online source, Acronymfinder.com, last visited 11 October 2008, identifies no fewer than
fourteen other meanings of “DIME”—some
slightly different from that just given, others
very different.)
55. In the background stands the timeless challenge of achieving genuine integration of
planning and decision processes. This is a
problem, having both specifically military
and wider strategic facets, where Eccles’s strategic thinking provides much valuable insight, building in part on his Joint Operations
Review Board background mentioned in note
39; his 1951–52 role, in a challenging period
early in NATO’s history, as Assistant Chief of
Staff, Logistics, for Commander, Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH);
plus relevant analytical work (see, e.g., Eccles,
Logistics in the National Defense, pp. 79–101).
56. Well after the events of 9/11, a basic related
problem—one whose impact permeates the
U.S. defense establishment from a grandstrategic down to a tactical level—remains
continuing insufficiency of personnel with
appropriate capabilities in critical languages.
See, e.g., Will Bardenwerper, “For Military,
Slow Progress in Foreign Language Push:
Struggle Persists over a Training Objective,”
New York Times, 22 September 2008, p. A20.
57. Note a French army officer’s well informed
account, based on his command experience
as a junior officer in France’s Algerian war, of
two contrasting mentalities in counterinsurgency warfare—whose exemplars he terms
“warriors” and “psychologists.” See David
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Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958,
with new foreword by Bruce Hoffman (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), pp. 64–68. To
the extent that doctrine can help bridge diverse mentalities, one idea—inspired in part
by work with the Eccles Papers, in part by
recent advances in network analysis—is
“seeding” carefully chosen imaginative
cross-references to connect doctrine statements whose subject matters would usually
be regarded as unrelated or largely so. The
goal of doing so would be to help encourage
disciplined but creative intellectual
cross-fertilization and analogical thinking.
58. A particularly forceful—in part because it is
so very terse—comment by Eccles directed
against weapon strategy stands the test of
time so well as to merit quotation here: “A
great danger lies in the possible domination
of strategy by weapons rather than by national objectives. National objectives ultimately are developed by the aspirations,
character, and sense of values of the people,
not by a technological triumph.
“If one becomes committed to a strategy
which is based on a weapon rather than upon
national objectives, a sense of frustration is
bound to ensue. Frustration frequently leads
men of high spirit to commit acts of reckless irresponsibility” (Eccles, “The Great Debate,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 7
[July 1954], p. 809, [emphasis supplied]).
The context for these words was, of course,
nuclear weapons and strategic airpower; the
substance could extend to other weapons systems—or to systems or capabilities of other
kinds, civilian as well as military.
59. Certain relevant military possibilities, importantly including possibilities of algorithm
sabotage suggested by a (nonsabotage) naval
warfare example from the 1982 Falklands
War, are analyzed in Scott A. Boorman and
Paul R. Levitt, “Deadly Bugs,” Chicago Tribune Magazine, 3 May 1987, p. 19ff. See also
Scott A. Boorman and Paul R. Levitt, “Software Warfare and Algorithm Sabotage,” Signal 42, no. 9 (May 1988), p. 75ff.
60. See Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality
in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and
American Ideas about Strategic Bombing,
1914–1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2002), especially the discussion of the
“industrial fabric theory” on pp. 163, 296–97.
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61. In fact, al-Qa‘ida “strategy” invites thorough
critical analysis along related lines. A key (if
perhaps long-term) limitation, and possibly
exploitable vulnerability, of al-Qa‘ida may
grow out of its apparent basic preoccupation
with strategy-as-destruction rather than
strategy-as-control.
62. Illustrating some of the intellectual possibilities, Karl W. Deutsch noted ancient Parthian
modes of warfare involving attacks directed
“at first not so much against the principal
material resources but rather against the
decision-making capacity” of an adversary.
See Nerves of Government, pp. 62, 274–75;
Eccles, “Strategy: The Essence of Professionalism,” Naval War College Review 24, no. 4
(December 1971), p. 50.
63. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,
1960), p. 36ff., and his Arms and Influence
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966),
p. 35–91.
64. See Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944, pp. 100–13.
Still an important source, by virtue of its author’s key pioneering role in wartime creation of a mobile logistics support capability,
is Rear Adm. Worrall R. Carter, USN (Ret.),
Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1953).
65. Consider Mao Zedong as strategist of revolution versus the Mao who later led the People’s Republic of China into the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
66. The relevant spirit of strategy/logistics synthesis is captured by former Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Adm. Robert B. Carney,
USN (Ret.): “Some General Observations and
Experiences in Logistics,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3, nos. 1 and 2 (March–June
1956), pp. 1–9 (building in part on Carney’s
World War II background as Adm. William
Halsey’s chief of staff, plus his postwar role as
Deputy CNO for Logistics).
67. A good set of approaches to all three tasks
should be crafted to meet the needs of both
strategic planners and strategic analysts—two
different roles that are often confused. The
crux of the difference is clarified by Eccles,
Military Concepts and Philosophy, p. 44: “A
strategic analyst can contribute greatly to the
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understanding of strategy without necessarily
being qualified to originate and develop a
specific national or military strategy. On the
other hand, there have been excellent strategists who have not made major contributions
to the historical or theoretical analysis of
strategy. For example, the maxims of Napoleon were gleaned from his notes and letters,
while Admiral Spruance has never written
any comprehensive statement of his own
concepts of strategy.”
68. The spirit of a counterpart in strategic studies
to the “endless frontier” of science concept of
Vannevar Bush is captured by an unpublished Eccles document, “Control of the Sea”:
“No single person can ever say everything
about control of the sea nor should we expect
agreement in all that is said by competent authority. Nevertheless, from time to time deep
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thinkers will express their thoughts on fundamental truths with such insight and clarity
that their words should be carefully preserved
and repeatedly referred to. A specific example
of this is contained in Admiral Spruance’s
discussion of control of the sea. The excellent
expressions of fundamental truth should not
be considered as a rigid and final formulation
but rather as a sound basis upon which men
can establish their own line of thinking and
ideas. The development of further ideas on
this basis is important and many novel interpretations and expressions can be usefully developed. However, the search for novelty and
fresh formulations should not go on without
periodic reference back to the classic
thought.” A copy bearing the dates 25 October 1956 and 14 December 1965 is in EP
82.23 in the Eccles Papers.

25

